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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Almost two years ago, the late Senator Edward Kennedy declared:  
For me, this is a season of hope, new hope for a justice and fair prosperity 
for the many and not just for the few, new hope. And this is the cause of 
my life, new hope that we will break the old gridlock and guarantee that 
                                                          
* Christopher Robert Smith; J.D. 2001, Vanderbilt University Law School; B.A. 1998, 
University of Richmond.  Christopher Smith is a Law and Government LL.M. candidate at 
American University’s Washington College of Law and Director of Policy and Regulatory 
Affairs with the National Community Pharmacists Association. The author wishes to thank 
Professor Corrine Parver at American University’s Washington College of Law for her 
inspiration, guidance and dedication to teaching her students about the importance of health 
care reform and coverage for all Americans, even when it seemed like comprehensive health 
care reform would fail. 
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every American -- north, south, east, west, young, old -- will have decent, 
quality health care as a fundamental right and not a privilege.1   
Today, Senator Kennedy’s “new hope” for universal health care coverage is a 
reality.  In March 2010, Congress finally enacted nationwide health care reform and 
an overhaul of the United States health insurance system, which aims to deliver near-
universal coverage for all Americans.  On March 23, 2010, President Barack Obama 
signed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act2 (“PPACA”) and, on 
March 30, 2010, he signed the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 
20103  (“HCERA”) (collectively the “Reform Law”), together representing the 
biggest overhaul of the United States health care system in the last 50 or 60 years.4 
The Congressional Budget Office has predicted that the final legislation “will 
provide coverage to more than 95% of all Americans.”5  
The significance of the federal health care reform legislation cannot be 
understated; the 111th Congress has succeeded where so many before have failed.6  
Still, Congress has arrived “late to the health care reform ball,” as a number of states, 
starting with Hawaii in the 1970s, and more recently, Maine, Vermont and 
Massachusetts, have been progressing towards universal health care coverage for 
many years.  These states have often been described as laboratories of innovation for 
health care reform efforts.7  In fact, Massachusetts’ recent health care reform 
legislation is seen as a model for the Reform Law.8   
                                                          
 1 Senator Edward Kennedy, Speech at 2008 Democratic National Convention (Aug. 26, 
2008), available at http://www.nydailynews.com/news/2008/08/25/2008-08-
25_text_of_ted_kennedys_speech_at_the_democ.html.  
 2 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
 3 See Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 
Stat. 1029.  
 4 David E. Theiss, The Medicare Hospice Benefit After Health Reform:  Cost Controls, 
Expanded Access, and System-Induced Pressures, 3 J. Health & Life Sci. L. 39, 39 (July, 
2010) (citing President Obama’s campaign adviser on health policy as stating that the PPACA 
is “essentially the biggest transformation of government since World War II”). 
 5 STAFF OF H. COMMS. ON WAYS AND MEANS, ENERGY AND COMMERCE, AND EDUC. AND 
LABOR, 111th CONG., REPORT ON AFFORDABLE HEALTH CARE FOR AMERICA 1, (Comm. Print 
2010), http://docs.house.gov/energycommerce/SUMMARY.pdf.   
 6 William P. Gunnar, M.D., The Fundamental Law that Shapes the United States Health 
Care System:  Is Universal Health Care Realistic within the Established Paradigm, 15 Annals 
Health L. 151, 157 (Winter, 2006) (noting that Presidents Roosevelt, Truman, Nixon and 
Carter all failed to implement health care reform); J. Paul Singleton, The Good, The Bad and 
The Ugly:  How the Due Process Clause May Limit Comprehensive Health Care Reform, 77 
Tenn. L. Rev. 413, 414 (Winter, 2010) (citing the failures of Presidents Roosevelt, Truman 
and Clinton to pass health care reform). 
 7 Susan Adler Channick, Will Americans Embrace Single-Payer Health Insurance:  The 
Intractable Barriers of Inertia, Free Market, and Culture, 28 Law & Ineq. 1, 9 (2010). 
 8 Joan Venocchi, Op-Ed., Fine-Tuning Health Care Costs, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 1, 2010, 
at A13, available at 
http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2010/04/01/fine_tuning_h
ealth_care_costs (stating that the recently enacted federal health care reform law used 
Massachusetts’ law as a template). 
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Given that the Reform Law is not operating on a blank slate, this article examines 
its impact on the health care reform efforts of three states:  Hawaii, Maine, and 
Vermont.  More specifically, this article examines each state’s health care reform 
plan, the outcomes of each plan in terms of achieving universal coverage or near-
universal coverage, and the likely impact of the federal health care reform legislation 
on these plans, with a particular focus on how the federal legislation and state laws 
will or will not work together to achieve near-universal coverage.  The article aims 
to determine whether the Reform Law unlocks the solutions to some of the dilemmas 
resulting from state health care reform efforts, or whether the Reform Law fails to do 
so or even exacerbates existing problems.   
This article focuses on the health care reform efforts of Hawaii, Maine and 
Vermont for three reasons.  First, each of the three states has taken different 
approaches toward achieving universal coverage.  Second, all three rank highly in 
terms of their low rate of uninsured residents, but have yet to achieve near-universal 
or universal coverage.9  Third, Maine and Vermont were chosen because the Kaiser 
Family Foundation has identified those two states as two of three states, 
Massachusetts being the third, which have enacted universal health care coverage 
legislation.10   
II.  HAWAII 
A.  The Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act 
Hawaii may be viewed as the “grandfather” of state health care reform in the 
United States, given that it first implemented health care reform over 30 years ago.  
In 1974, Hawaii passed the Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act (“PHCA”), which ties 
health care reform to an employer mandate.11  Hawaii’s employer mandate provision 
is unique among the states because state employer mandates are generally preempted 
by the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”).12  In fact, 
                                                          
 9 Massachusetts was another potential candidate for analysis, as well.  However, as of the 
end of 2008, the Massachusetts Health Connector reports that Massachusetts’ uninsured rate is 
only 2.7%.  Commonwealth Health Ins. Connector Auth., Massachusetts Health Care Reform 
2009 Progress Report, HEALTH CONNECTOR, 4 (2009), https://www.mahealthconnector. 
org/portal/binary/com.epicentric.contentmanagement.servlet.ContentDeliveryServlet/Health%
2520Care%2520Reform/Overview/Connector%2520Progress%2520Report%252009.pdf. Thi
s represents near-universal coverage, so it is unlikely that the Reform Law will improve 
Massachusetts’ scope of coverage, particularly given that the Reform Law is modeled after 
Massachusetts’ plan. 
 10 KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID AND THE INSURED, States Moving Toward 
Comprehensive Health Care Reform, Kaiser Family Foundation (May 19, 2009), 
http://www.kff.org/uninsured/kcmu_statehealthreform.cfm (stating that “[t]hree states, Maine, 
Massachusetts and Vermont, have enacted and are implementing reform plans that seek to 
achieve near universal coverage of state residents”). 
 11 HAW. REV STAT. §§ 393-1 to 393-51 (1974).  See Peter D. Jacobson & Rebecca L. 
Braun, Let 1000 Flowers Wilt:  The Futility of State-Level Health Care Reform, 55 U. Kan. L. 
Rev. 1173, 1175 (2007) (summarizing the history of Hawaiian health care reform legislation 
and why it has not been successful). 
 12 Jacobson & Braun, supra note 11, at 1176 (discussing ERISA exemption of employee 
benefit plans from state insurance regulation). 
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Hawaii was forced to obtain a Congressional waiver to implement its employer 
mandate, and no other state, to date, has obtained such a waiver.13  Significantly, the 
Hawaii ERISA exemption only applies to the PHCA as it existed in 1974, when 
ERISA was first enacted, and Hawaii may not modify the PHCA in any way.14   
The PHCA employer mandate requires all Hawaiian employers to provide 
coverage to any employee who is paid monthly wages that are 86.67 times the 
minimum hourly wage, works more than twenty hours per week for four consecutive 
weeks, and does not have an alternative source of health insurance.15  The PHCA 
also requires employers to meet certain minimum benefit standards, defined as 
“health care benefits equal to, or medically reasonably substitutable for, the benefits 
provided by prepaid health plans of the same type, . . . which have the largest 
numbers of subscribers in the State.”16  The minimum benefit requirements specified 
within the statute include hospital benefits, surgical benefits, medical benefits, 
diagnostic laboratory services, maternity benefits, and substance abuse benefits.17  
Notably absent is any requirement that employers’ plans provide mental health 
benefits, other than substance abuse benefits, dental or vision benefits.   
Along with benefit requirements, the PHCA also imposes cost requirements on 
employers.  The PHCA requires covered employers to contribute at least one-half of 
their employees’ premium costs, and “in no case shall the employee contribute more 
than 1.5 per cent of the employee's wages.”18  Although the employer foots a large 
share of the premium costs, “an employer who employs less than eight 
employees . . . shall be entitled to premium supplementation . . . if the employer's 
share of the cost of providing such coverage . . . exceeds 1.5 per cent of the total 
wages payable to such employees and if the amount of such excess is greater than 
five per cent of the employer's income before taxes.”19   
Although the PHCA addressed coverage for most employed Hawaiians, it failed 
to address coverage for the unemployed.  Accordingly, in 1994, Hawaii obtained a 
Medicaid waiver to create the QUEST program, which “stands for Quality of care, 
Universal access, Efficient utilization, Stable cost, and Transformation.”20  QUEST 
began as a demonstration project and operated to shift Medicaid enrollees onto 
private managed care and to offer a limited benefits package to low income, 
uninsured, adult Medicaid ineligible Hawaiians who earn up to 300% of the Federal 
Poverty Level (“FPL”).21  Although QUEST is designed to fully cover parents and 
                                                          
 13 Jacobson & Braun, supra note 11, at 1176. 
 14 Christen Linke Young, Pay or Play Programs and ERISA Section 514:  Proposals for 
Amending the Statutory Scheme, 10 Yale J. Health Pol’y, L. & Ethics 197, 206, 231 (2010) 
(describing how Hawaii avoided ERISA preemption).  See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(5)(B)(ii) 
(2006). 
 15 HAW. REV STAT. §§ 393-3, 393-11, 393-14 (1974).   
 16 Id. § 393-7(a). 
 17 Id. § 393-7(c). 
 18 Id. § 393-13.   
 19 Id. § 393-45(a).   
 20 Sylvia A. Law, Health Care in Hawai’i:  An Agenda for Research and Reform, 26 Am. 
J.L. & Med. 205, 207 (2000) (describing Hawaii’s QUEST program). 
 21 Jacobson & Braun, supra note 11, at 1177; Law, supra note 20, at 207-08. 
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childless adults who earn up to 100% of the FPL, enrollment is presently closed for 
childless adults.22  For those with family incomes above 133% of the FPL and 
pregnant women with incomes above 185% of the FPL, QUEST requires the 
payment of premiums on a sliding scale basis.23   
Beyond the PHCA and QUEST, Hawaii’s Blue Cross/Blue Shield organization, 
the Hawaii Medical Services Association (“HMSA”), has also played a significant 
role in Hawaii’s progress toward universal coverage.24  HMSA is essentially a 
monopsony and has established a de facto private single payor system in Hawaii.25  
It is responsible for administering Medicare and provides administrative services for 
some Hawaiian managed care organizations and enrolls almost half of Hawaii’s non-
government employees.26  Some scholars contend that Hawaii’s low health care 
costs are due in part to HMSA’s monopsony power.27   
Another angle to Hawaiian health care reform is Hawaii’s focus on primary 
health care and its “large, strong network of community health centers.”28  Hawaiian 
health centers have proven important because they help to identify sectors of the 
population without health insurance and provide assistance to individuals with 
applying for coverage.29  The health centers also lower health care costs by 
providing less costly preventive care to vulnerable populations and by shifting 
patients’ reliance on care away from more costly hospital out-patient clinics and 
emergency rooms.30 
B.  Hawaii’s Coverage Outcomes 
Since enactment of the PHCA, Hawaii’s coverage outcomes have resembled a 
roller coaster.  In the beginning, Hawaii’s employer “mandate had dramatic 
effects . . . reducing Hawaii’s uninsured population from 30% in the early 1970s to 
as low as 5% in the 1980s.”31  However, there were a number of unintended negative 
consequences of the employer mandate, as 55% of employers restricted wage 
increases, 33% reduced other benefits, 40% reduced the number of employees, 10% 
hired part-time employees to replace full-time employees, and 60% raised prices to 
                                                          
 22 Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, Medicaid and State Funded Coverage Income 
Eligibility Limits for Low-Income Adults, 2009, STATEHEALTHFACTS.ORG, n.5 (2009), http:// 
www.statehealthfacts.org/comparereport.jsp?rep=54&cat=4.  
 23 Law, supra note 20, at 208. 
 24 Law, supra note 20, at 210 (describing HMSA’s role in Hawaii’s health care reform 
success). 
 25 Law, supra note 20,  at 210-11. 
 26 Law, supra note 20, . at 210. 
 27 Law, supra note 20, at 211. 
 28 Law, supra note 20, at 209 (arguing that Hawaii’s community health centers assure care 
and promote health insurance coverage). 
 29 Law, supra note 20,  
 30 Law, supra note 20,  at 209-10. 
 31 Carolyn V. Juarez, Liberty, Justice, and Insurance for All:  Re-Imagining the 
Employment-Based Health Insurance System, 37 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 881, 891 (2004) 
(describing Hawaii’s employer mandate as a failed attempt at health care reform). 
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offset health care costs.32  Moreover, Hawaii’s initial success waned by the early to 
mid 2000’s, as the percentage of uninsured Hawaiians increased to 10% of the 
population and the percentage of uninsured workers or employees stood at 58%.33  
Analysts attribute the increased uninsured rate to a combination of “sharply rising 
insurance rates, [increased] hiring [of] part-time workers, and an increase in the 
number of self-employed workers.”34  Generally, employers shifted their workforce 
to a part-time workforce, and even laid off employees for a few days every four 
weeks in order to have them categorized as part-time employees.35     
The most recent statistics show a slight improvement in health care coverage 
rates for Hawaii, but they have still not returned to their 1980s levels.  In 2008, an 
average of 7.8% of Hawaiian residents remained uninsured, which is the second best 
uninsured rate in the country behind Massachusetts.36  By comparison, in 1994, 
Hawaii’s uninsured rate was 9.4% and from 2005 to 2008, Hawaii decreased its 
uninsured rate by .9%.37  Accordingly, Hawaii seems to be slowly making 
improvements in its coverage rates. 
Given that Hawaii’s health care reform efforts are centered upon an employer 
mandate, it is also important to evaluate the Hawaiian reform effort by examining its 
employer-based coverage statistics.  Examining Hawaii in isolation from other 
states, the outcomes are underwhelming, as in 2007 and 2008, 58.7% of uninsured 
Hawaiians were part of families with at least one full-time worker (“worker 
families”), a surprising statistic in light of Hawaii’s employer mandate.38  In fact, the 
percentage of employer-based coverage in Hawaii increased by only .6% between 
2005 and 2008.39   
Although Hawaii’s employer-based coverage statistics are lackluster in isolation, 
when comparing Hawaii to other states, it has the second smallest percentage of 
uninsureds who are part of worker families.40  Moreover, 85.4% of private firms in 
Hawaii offered health insurance to their employees in 2009, the highest of any state 
                                                          
 32 Id. at 892. 
 33 Id. at 891. 
 34 Id. at 891-92. 
 35 Law, supra note 20, at 212 (questioning Hawaii’s health care reforms as a model for 
other states). 
 36 U.S. Census Bureau, Health Insurance Coverage Status by State for All People: 2008, 
Current Population Survey (2009), http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/cpstables/032009/health 
/h06_000.htm.  
 37 Robert L. Bennefield, U.S. Census Bureau, Health Insurance Coverage – 1994, Current 
Population Reports, 4 (Oct. 1995), http://www.census.gov/prod/1/pop/p60-190.pdf.; Kaiser 
Family Foundation, Percentage Point Change Among Nonelderly Adults 19-64 by Coverage 
Type, 2005-2008, WWW.STATEHEALTHFACTS.ORG (2009), http://www.statehealthfacts.org/ 
comparetable.jsp?ind=171&cat=3.  
 38 Kaiser Family Foundation, Distribution of the Nonelderly Uninsured by Family Work 
Status, States (2007-2008), U.S. (2008), WWW.STATEHEALTHFACTS.ORG, http://www.state 
healthfacts.org/comparetable.jsp?ind=135&cat=3&sub=40&yr=134&typ=2. 
 39 Kaiser Family Foundation, supra note 37.  
 40 Kaiser Family Foundation, supra note 38. 
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in the country by 11.3%.41  The cost of employer-based coverage in Hawaii is also 
among the lowest of any state, probably as a result of increased primary care, 
preventative care, and bargaining by employers who are required to pay for 
coverage.42     
Hawaii’s employer-based coverage percentages are confusing.  There is a high 
percentage of uninsureds who are members of worker families, and yet there is an 
employer mandate and Hawaii has the highest percentage of employers offering 
coverage in the nation.  One possible answer is that the PHCA does not require 
employers to provide coverage for employees’ dependents, which may explain why 
some children and unemployed or part-time working spouses may not have health 
care coverage, even though the full-time worker in the family does have coverage.43  
An alternative or additional explanation is that the PHCA allows employees to waive 
employer-based coverage.44  This explains a higher than expected percentage of 
working uninsureds, particularly if some employees have decided that they are 
healthy enough to do without health insurance or that they cannot afford insurance.           
Depending on the rate of unemployment, one would expect the Hawaiian 
employer mandate to yield a fairly low rate of Medicaid enrollees in Hawaii.  The 
statistics are supportive to some extent, as in 2008, 12.3% of the Hawaiian 
population received Medicaid, the 22nd lowest rate in the nation.45  As a result, 
Hawaii’s health care spending is low compared to other states and the portion of its 
budget going toward Medicaid costs is lower than most other states.46  Arguably, 
Hawaii’s unique focus on employer-provided coverage should probably result in an 
even smaller Medicaid population.  However, a somewhat larger than expected 
Medicaid population may be the result of economic downturns, elevated 
unemployment statistics, employers not providing coverage for employee 
dependents, employers cutting full-time jobs, employers cutting wages and/or 
employers shifting to a part-time workforce.  
C.  The Impact of the National Health Reform Law on Hawaii 
The Senate Democratic Policy Committee (“DPC”) has published a report 
predicting key benefits of the Reform Law for each state.  In terms of overall 
                                                          
 41 Kaiser Family Foundation, Percent of Private Sector Establishments That Offer Health 
Insurance to Employees, 2009, WWW.STATEHEALTHFACTS.ORG (2009), http://www.statehealth 
facts.org/comparemaptable.jsp?ind=175&cat=3.  
 42 Jason Burge, Rethinking Fees and Taxes in Light of the New York City Health Care 
Security Act, 61  N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 679, 685 (2006) (describing the cost benefits of 
the PHCA to employers). 
 43 HAW. REV STAT. §§ 393-7(b), 393-21(f) (1974).   
 44 Id. §§ 393-7(b), 393-21.   
 45 Kaiser Family Foundation, Health Insurance Coverage of the Total Population, states 
(2007 - 2008), U.S. (2008), WWW.STATEHEALTHFACTS.ORG (2008), http://www.statehealth 
facts.org/comparetable.jsp?ind=125&cat=3.  
 46 Kaiser Family Foundation, Health Care Expenditures Per Capita by State of Residence, 
2004, WWW.STATEHEALTHFACTS.ORG (Sept. 2007), http://www.statehealthfacts.org/compare 
maptable.jsp?ind=596&cat=5; Kaiser Family Foundation, Distribution of State General Fund 
Expenditures (In Millions), SFY2008, WWW.STATEHEALTHFACTS.ORG (2009), http://www. 
statehealthfacts.org/comparetable.jsp?typ=2&ind=33&cat=1&sub=10.  
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coverage, the DPC predicts that the Reform Law will provide new coverage options 
for 123,000 presently uninsured Hawaiians.47  On the cost savings side, 78,200 
Hawaiians will receive tax credits for health insurance premiums and average family 
health insurance premiums will be reduced by $1,460 to $2,080 a year.48   
Focusing on a more specific population, the DPC predicts that for the poorest 
Hawaiians, the Reform Law will expand Medicaid to cover an additional 116,666 
Hawaiian residents.49  Hawaii’s poor will also benefit through additional federal 
funding for Hawaii’s safety net in its 82 Community Health Centers.50   
Turning to Hawaiian employers, the DPC predicts that 18,000 Hawaiian small 
businesses will be eligible for tax credits to assist in paying for the employer’s share 
of employee premiums.51  These 18,000 small businesses employ 75,820 Hawaii 
residents.52  Hopefully, the federal tax credits will encourage small employers to 
expand coverage and will stem the current movement toward hiring part-time help to 
avoid the mandate.  Similarly, there may be optimism that the Reform Law will slow 
the growth rate of health care costs, resulting in possibly 1,100 to 1,800 new jobs 
each year in Hawaii, as businesses find it more profitable to expand employment.53  
Although the DPC’s predictions look promising, the more important analysis is 
whether or how the PHCA and Reform Law will interact together to achieve near-
universal coverage.  One aspect of the interplay between the PHCA and the Reform 
Law is that the two laws create differing employer mandates.  Hawaii’s employer 
mandate covers almost all employers, whereas the Reform Law’s employer mandate 
covers only employers with more than fifty employees and at least one full-time 
employee receiving a tax credit.54  Moreover, unlike Hawaii’s law, the Reform Law 
provides those employers with an option to either provide coverage or pay a fee per 
employee, excluding the first thirty employees.55   
From the employer-based coverage perspective, Hawaii’s mandate is much more 
stringent than the federal mandate. Were the two provisions to compete, Hawaii’s 
mandate would likely result in a higher insured rate.  Fortunately, for scope of 
coverage purposes, the federal employer mandate does not preempt Hawaii’s 
employer mandate, as the PPACA expressly provides that “nothing in this title . . . 
shall be construed to modify or limit the application of the exemption of Hawaii’s 
Prepaid Health Care Act . . . as provided for under section 514(b)(5) of [ERISA.]”56  
                                                          
 47 STAFF OF S. DEMOCRATIC POLICY COMM., 111th CONG., SPECIAL REPORT, THE BENEFITS 
OF HEALTH REFORM IN HAWAII 1 (Comm. Print 2010), http://dpc.senate.gov/docs/sr-111-2-
41_states/hi.pdf. 
 48 Id. at 3. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. at 2. 
 51 Id.  
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1513.  
 55 Health Care Education and Reconciliation Act of 2010 § 1003(a). 
 56 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1560(b). 
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Accordingly, taking the Reform Law employer mandate into consideration, Hawaii’s 
unique and stringent employer mandate should result in Hawaii having a greater 
employer-based coverage rate compared to any other state.   
Even though the Hawaiian carve-out is likely to lead to higher coverage rates, 
Hawaiian employers, concerned about bearing higher health insurance costs than 
other states under the Reform Law, may creatively challenge the federal Reform 
Law in court under an Equal Protection argument.  Though they are unlikely to 
succeed, small employers, with 50 employees or less, may claim that they are being 
singled out as not exempt from the federal employer mandate when compared to 
small employers in other states.  Moreover, all Hawaiian employers may claim that 
they are being unfairly burdened to provide costly coverage to employees, whereas 
employers in other states have the choice to pay a tax penalty instead.   
Although the Reform Law’s PHCA exemption is likely to result in higher 
employer-based coverage rates than other states, the Reform Law will yield mixed 
results in terms of solving some of the problems associated with the PHCA’s 
employer mandate.  On the positive side, the Reform Law provides a tax credit to 
small employers who provide health coverage and who have 25 or fewer employees 
and average annual wages of less than $50,000.57  This will add to the premium 
supplement that some Hawaiian employers already receive under the PHCA and may 
encourage more small employers to provide coverage to their employees and avoid 
searching for ways around the Hawaii employer mandate.  That said, the tax credit 
phases out as firm size and average wages increase and, starting in 2014, only 
applies to a small business for the first two years that it offers coverage purchased 
through the health insurance exchange.58      
Mostly, the Reform Law does little to solve the PHCA’s employer mandate 
problems.  First, there is no federal fix for the problem of Hawaiian businesses hiring 
part-time workers or laying off workers for a few days every four weeks to avoid the 
state employer mandate.59  Second, the Reform Law does not change the fact that 
Hawaiian employers may choose not to offer dependent care coverage.  However, 
those plans that choose to provide dependent coverage, must allow children to 
remain on their parents’ plans until the age of 26.60  Third, Hawaiian employees may 
still waive the Hawaiian employer mandate, although they would probably be 
subject to the Reform Law’s individual insurance mandate, discussed infra.  Fourth, 
the Reform Law does nothing to remedy Hawaii’s “low [employer mandate] 
compliance rate and poor enforcement of the employer mandate.”61  Fifth, the 
Reform Law does not alter Hawaii’s ERISA waiver to allow the state to alter and 
adapt the PHCA to meet changes in health care, especially rising health care costs to 
employers.62   
While the Reform Law is likely to have little direct impact on Hawaii’s 
employer-based coverage, the Reform Law’s Medicaid changes and state-based 
                                                          
 57 Id. § 1421. 
 58 Id. § 1421(e)(2). 
 59 Law, supra note 20, at 212. 
 60 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2714(a-. 
 61 Jacobson & Braun, supra note 11, at 1177; Law, supra note 20, at 212-13. 
 62 Jacobson & Braun, supra note 11, at 1177; Burge, supra note 42, at 686. 
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Basic Health Plan option should benefit the QUEST program.  Shortly after 
implementation, QUEST developed financial problems as enrollment was much 
higher than expected, state policy makers failed to increase funding for the program, 
and Hawaii had to cut back on QUEST eligibility and benefits packages in the 
1990s, thereby excluding many low-income families from coverage.63  At first 
glance, the Reform Law may appear to make state financial matters worse as it 
increases Hawaii’s financial Medicaid burden by expanding Medicaid coverage to 
all individuals earning up to 133% of the FPL, whereas Hawaii’s present Medicaid 
program is presently more limited and only covers childless adults, parents, the aged, 
blind and the disabled up to 100% of the FPL.64  However, the cost increase concerns 
are offset as the Reform Law increases Hawaii’s Federal Medicaid Assistance 
Percentage (“FMAP”) to 90% by 2020 for those who become newly eligible for 
Medicaid under the Reform Law’s Medicaid expansion.65  This is more than 20% 
above the FY 2010 FMAP for Hawaii for currently eligible Medicaid recipients.66  
This increased federal funding should cover the costs of Medicaid expansion and 
free up state funds for Hawaii to use in sustaining QUEST and reopening QUEST 
enrollment for groups for which it has been closed.   
More directly, QUEST may receive new federal funding under the Reform Law’s 
Basic Health Plan option, which allows states to create a Basic Health Plan for 
uninsured individuals between the new Medicaid level, 133% of FPL, and 200% of 
the FPL.67  The federal government will pay the states 95% of the funds that it would 
have paid in federal premium and cost-sharing subsidies for these Basic Health Plan 
enrollees, if those individuals had purchased insurance through the health insurance 
exchanges contemplated under the Reform Law.68  Accordingly, if Hawaii chooses 
to keep QUEST as its Basic Health Plan under the Reform Law, then the state will 
receive an influx of federal funding for QUEST, except for QUEST enrollees 
between 200% and 300% of the FPL.  At the same time, in compliance with the 
Basic Health Plan option, Hawaii must ensure that QUEST complies with the 
Reform Law mandates of providing coverage for certain essential health benefits, as 
well as ensuring that eligible individuals do not pay more in premiums than they 
would have paid in the exchanges or pay more than the income-based cost-sharing 
maximums permitted under the Reform Law.69          
                                                          
 63 Law, supra note 20, at 208-09 (discussing the history of the QUEST program). 
 64 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2001; KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID AND 
THE UNINSURED, supra note 22; Income Elegibility Requirements, KAISER COMM’N ON 
MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED (2009), http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparereport.jsp? 
rep=59&cat=4. 
 65 Health Care Education and Reconciliation Act of 2010 § 1201. 
 66 Federal Financial Participation in State Assistance Expenditures; Federal Matching 
Shares for Medicaid, the State Children's Health Insurance Program, and Aid to Needy Aged, 
Blind, or Disabled Persons for October 1, 2009 Through September 30, 2010 ,73 Fed. Reg. 
72051, 72052 (Nov. 26, 2008) (setting Hawaii’s FMAP for FY 2010 at 67.97%). 
 67 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1331(e)(1)(B). 
 68 Id. § 1331(d)(3)(A)(i). 
 69 Id. § 1331(a)(2)(A)(i). 
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If Hawaii is able to increase its funding of QUEST and if there is new federal 
funding of QUEST, then new federal funding to states under the Reform Law may 
also resolve critics’ concerns that QUEST threatens the fiscal health of Hawaii’s 
community health centers.70  Ever since the implementation of QUEST, community 
health centers caring for QUEST patients no longer receive payment on a generous 
fee-for-service basis, have received curtailed state subsidies, and have faced 
unreasonably low capitated payments.71  The increased federal Medicaid funding 
may free up state funds to provide greater state subsidies, as well as fee-for-service 
payments to community health centers.  The Reform Law also directly benefits 
Hawaii’s community health centers by increasing federal funding to those health 
centers by $11 billion from 2011 through 2015.72        
Also outside of the interplay between the PHCA and the Reform Law is the 
impact of the new federal law on HMSA in Hawaii.  While HMSA has provided a 
number of benefits to the Hawaiian health care system, its monopsony power has 
also resulted in negative effects, including claims of inadequate payment to 
providers through the absolute power to set payment rights and the right to exclude 
providers from HMSA, as well as claims of HMSA’s interference with providers’ 
professional judgment through “medically necessary” provisions in insurance 
contracts.73  There is also a concern that low hospital reimbursement from HMSA is 
hurting hospitals that serve rural and underserved Hawaiians.74  
Under the Reform Law, the monopsony power of HMSA will likely change with 
the creation, by 2014, of state-based non-profit or state run American Health Benefit 
Exchanges (“AHBE”) for the individual purchase of insurance, and Small Business 
Health Options Program (“SHOP”) Exchanges for small businesses with 100 
employees or less to purchase insurance.75  Starting in 2017, the Reform Law also 
authorizes states to allow businesses with more than 100 employees to purchase 
coverage through the SHOP Exchanges.76  Moreover, the Reform Law funds a 
Consumer Operated and Oriented Plan (“CO-OP”) program to encourage the 
creation of non-profit, member-run health insurance companies in each state.77  Both 
the exchange-based initiatives and CO-OP program introduce buyer-side 
competition in Hawaii, where little currently exists in light of HMSA.  With 
increased buyer-side competition, health care providers on the supply side will gain 
more bargaining power, and as a result, should be more successful in bargaining for 
more adequate payment rates and avoiding exclusion from insurance plans.   
                                                          
 70 Law, supra note 20, at 210 (describing the negative impact of QUEST on Hawaii’s 
community health centers). 
 71 Jacobson & Braun, supra note 11, at 1177 (discussing cutbacks in funding and services 
to community health centers as a result of QUEST); Law, supra note 20, at 210. 
 72 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 10503(b)(2). 
 73 Law, supra note 20, at 211 (evaluating the positive and negative effects of HMSA on 
the Hawaiian health care system). 
 74 Id. at 212. 
 75  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act §§ 1304(b)(2), 1311. 
 76 Id. § 1312. 
 77 Id. § 1322. 
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Despite the overall benefits of increased insurance provider competition, there 
may be negative effects as a result of the creation of exchanges in Hawaii.  First, the 
low health care costs associated with HMSA’s monopsony power may increase as 
health care providers gain the power to raise rates with more buyers in the system; 
the buyer-side rate setting monopsony power will be gone.  Second, HMSA has such 
a stranglehold on the buyer-side of the Hawaiian health care market that it may be 
difficult to encourage other insurers to join the Hawaiian exchanges and encourage 
the creation of CO-OP plans.  Potential entrants may be concerned about the 
difficulties of entering a market where a single competitor controls fifty percent of 
the market share.  Matters are only made worse by Hawaii’s geographic isolation.  
The cost of opening shop in Hawaii and moving personnel to Hawaii is likely to be 
much more expensive than a situation where an insurance company in Maryland 
decides it wants to expand operations and join Virginia’s health care insurance 
exchanges.        
Finally, in assessing the impact of the Reform Law on Hawaii’s health care 
system, it is important to examine the option for states, starting in 2017, to apply for 
a five-year waiver from the Reform Law’s requirements regarding qualified health 
plans, exchanges, cost-sharing reductions, tax credits, the individual mandate and the 
employer mandate. 78  States applying for a waiver must implement an alternative 
coverage plan that is at least as comprehensive and affordable as the minimum plan 
contemplated under the Reform Law, and covers as many residents as would be 
covered under the Reform Law.79  For those states with high uninsured rates or those 
states with unaffordable health care, the waiver option might not be viable.  
However, Hawaii’s 2008 uninsured rate of 7.8%80 is relatively close to the 5% 
national uninsured rate, as predicted by the CBO under the PPACA.81  Moreover, 
Hawaii’s health care costs are currently reasonably low compared to other states. 82  
Accordingly, Hawaii may choose to waive out of certain aspects of the Reform Law.  
For example, Hawaii may prefer HMSA’s monopsony situation over the health 
exchange idea, and may decide to waive that Reform Law provision.  Nonetheless, 
the waiver may not be as attractive as it would seem because the waiver does not 
                                                          
 78 Id. § 1332. 
 79 Id. 
 80 U.S. Census Bureau, Health Insurance Coverage Status by State for All People: 2008, 
Current Population Survey (2009), 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/cpstables/032009/health/h06_000.htm. 
 81 STAFF OF H. COMMS. ON WAYS AND MEANS, ENERGY AND COMMERCE, AND EDUC. AND 
LABOR, 111th CONG., REPORT ON AFFORDABLE HEALTH CARE FOR AMERICA 1, (Comm. Print 
2010), http://docs.house.gov/energycommerce/SUMMARY.pdf.   
 82 Kaiser Family Foundation, Health Care Expenditures Per Capita by State of Residence, 
2004, WWW.STATEHEALTHFACTS.ORG (Sept. 2007), http://www.statehealthfacts.org/compare 
maptable.jsp?ind=596&cat=5; Kaiser Family Foundation, Distribution of State General Fund 
Expenditures (In Millions), SFY2008, WWW.STATEHEALTHFACTS.ORG (2009), http://www.state 
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begin until after almost all of the Reform Law elements are already required to be 
implemented and it only lasts for five years.83    
III.  MAINE 
A.  The Dirigo Health Reform Act 
In the 21st century, Maine has been the trailblazer for universal health care 
among the states.  In June 2003, Maine enacted the Dirigo Health Reform Act (the 
“Dirigo Act”).84  Among the goals of the Dirigo Act was the aim to cover Maine’s 
130,000 uninsured residents by 2009 through a new health plan.85  Under the Dirigo 
Act, the central vehicle for achieving universal coverage is a voluntary “state-
sponsored health plan administered by . . . [a single] private insurer” 
(“DirigoChoice”).86  DirigoChoice is primarily directed toward encouraging small 
businesses to provide insurance coverage to their employees, but it also offers 
coverage to those who are self-employed, unemployed, or employed by a small 
business that does not offer health insurance.87   
DirigoChoice was originally funded through individual and employer insurance 
contributions, as well as an upfront payment by Maine of fifty-three million 
dollars.88  The program was designed to be sustained through a savings offset 
payment (“SOP”) from insurers, which is “a two percent surcharge to all health care 
insurance gross premium revenues that exceed four percent.”89  However, on 
October 1, 2009, the state legislature repealed the SOP.90         
Turning to DirigoChoice’s participation requirements, the state’s contracting 
insurer must qualify under Medicaid and must meet minimum coverage 
requirements, including ensuring that providers “do not refuse to provide services to 
a plan enrollee on the basis of health status, medical condition, [or] previous 
                                                          
 83 Should a state choose to waive out of certain Reform Law provisions and be able to 
demonstrate comprehensive and affordable coverage results, it seems unlikely that the federal 
government would not allow that state to renew its waiver program after five years.  
 84 ME. REV. STAT. ANN, tit. 24-A, §§ 6901-6981 (2007); Mark E. Douglas, Finally Moving 
Beyond the Fiction:  An Overview of the Recent State Rally for Health Care Reform, 5 Ind. 
Health L. Rev. 277, 293 (2008) (outlining and evaluating Maine’s health care reform plan). 
 85 Douglas, supra note 84, at 293. 
 86 Douglas, supra note 84, at 293; See also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, §§ 6902, 
6910(1) (2003); Annual Report State Fiscal Year 2008, DIRIGO HEALTH AGENCY, 2 (2009), 
http://www.dirigohealth.maine.gov/Documents/SFY%202008%20Annual%20Report%20012
009.pdf. 
 87 ME. REV. STAT. ANN, tit. 24-A, § 6903(7) (2007); Jonathan M. Kucskar, Laboratories of 
Democracy:  Why State Health Care Experimentation Offers the Best Chance to Enact 
Effective Federal Health Care Reform, 11 J. Health Care L. & Pol’y 377, 378 (2008) 
(describing the focus of Maine’s health insurance reform plan); Douglas, supra note 84, at 
293.      
 88 Douglas, supra note 84, at 293 (discussing the funding of DirigoChoice). 
 89 Douglas, supra note 84, at 293. 
 90 ME. REV. STAT. ANN, tit. 24-A, § 6913 (repealed 2009). 
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insurance status.”91  For small businesses enrolling in DirigoChoice, eligibility is 
limited to those who employ between two and fifty employees, and participating 
employers must “certify that at least 75% of their employees that work 30 hours or 
more per week and who do not have other creditable coverage are enrolled in the 
Dirigo Health Program.”92   
DirigoChoice for employers operates by small businesses choosing one of three 
plans to offer employees with deductibles ranging from $1,250 to $2,500, 
corresponding decreasing monthly individual premiums from $364 to $331 and out 
of pocket annual maximums of between $3,500 and $5,600.93  Participating 
employers must pay at least 60% of their employees’ premium costs and the 
legislation authorizes Dirigo Health, the executive agency overseeing the program, 
to require mandatory minimum employer contributions toward coverage for 
dependents.94   
Similar to employers, individual and the self-employed DirigoChoice enrollees 
choose one of two health plans with out of pocket maximums ranging from $3,500 
to $5,600 and one plan with a deductible of $1,750 and a $458 individual monthly 
premium and a second plan with a deductible of $2,500 and a $451 individual 
monthly premium.95  This means, without accounting for state subsidies for low 
income individuals, that an individual who purchases the cheapest DirigoChoice 
plan and makes as little as $30,000 annually could end up paying almost $8,000 per 
year in health care costs or more than one-third of their income, if you add the 
premiums and deductible together.    
Focusing on the lowest income Mainers, the Dirigo Act expands Medicaid “to 
cover all adults below 100 percent of the FPL and parents below 200 percent of the 
FPL.”96  Even those who are ineligible for Medicaid, but earn less than 300% of the 
FPL receive lower sliding scale deductibles and premiums under DirigoChoice.97  
For example, individuals enrolling in the high deductible $2,500 deductible plan and 
who fall between 100% and 149% of the FPL receive a subsidy of 80% of their 
monthly premiums, pay a $500 deductible, and are subject to a $700 annual out-of-
pocket maximum.98  This means that a person making a little under $15,000 annually 
may have to pay approximately $1,600 in annual health care costs, adding the 
premiums and deductible together.  These subsidies phase out as income rises.  
However, compared with individuals making $30,000 or more per year, these low 
                                                          
 91 ME. REV. STAT. ANN, tit. 24-A, § 6910(3).    
 92 ME. REV. STAT. ANN, tit. 24-A, §§ 6903(5), 6910(4)(B)(4); see also Dirigo Health’s 
FAQ’s, DIRIGO HEALTH AGENCY, http://www.dirigohealth.maine.gov/Pages/faq.html (last 
visited Sept. 28, 2010). 
 93 Annual Report State Fiscal Year 2008, DIRIGO HEALTH AGENCY, supra note 86, at 25-
28. 
 94 ME. REV. STAT. ANN, tit. 24-A, § 6910(4)(B)(3). 
 95 Id. 
 96 Karen Davis & Christine Haran, Innovative State and Federal Initiatives to Cover the 
Uninsured and Increase Access to Care, 19 Health Law. 1, 3 (June, 2007) (describing Maine’s 
efforts to provide coverage for low income individuals). 
 97 Id.   
 98 Annual Report State Fiscal Year 2008, DIRIGO HEALTH AGENCY, supra note 86, at 25. 
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income individuals receive a better bargain, as the former pays more than one third 
of their income toward health care costs and the latter pays a little more than 10% of 
their income toward health care costs.   
Since the initial enactment of the Dirigo Act, Maine has tweaked the legislation 
in three ways.  First, in 2007, the Maine legislature amended the Dirigo Act to allow 
Dirigo Health to self-administer DirigoChoice, instead of contracting with a private 
insurance carrier.99  Prior to this amendment, some had criticized the Dirigo Act for 
increasing government bureaucracy and administrative costs by having two layers to 
the program, a private insurer layer and a Dirigo Health layer.100  Second, Maine 
enacted a requirement that insurance companies allow insureds to insure their 
dependent children up to the age of 25.101  Third, the Maine legislature amended the 
Dirigo Act to include a reinsurance program in order to lower premiums in the 
individual market.102    
B.  Maine’s Coverage Outcomes 
Since the beginning of DirigoChoice in 2003, plan enrollment has been less than 
spectacular.  As of February 2010, DirigoChoice had only enrolled a little under 
31,000 of Maine’s 130,000 uninsured residents.103  Moreover, noting that one of the 
goals of DirigoChoice was to cover the previously uninsured, as of 2008, only 36% 
of DirigoChoice individual members were previously uninsured.104   
Though the voluntariness and high buyer-side costs of DirigoChoice contribute 
to low enrollment, as discussed infra, to some extent the tepid enrollment statistics 
are self-imposed by Maine to fight high costs.  Since September 2007, Dirigo Health 
has capped enrollment in DirigoChoice as a way to manage the high costs of 
DirigoChoice to the state. 105  In fact, as of the last DirigoChoice annual report in 
2008, there were 2,000 Maine residents on the waiting list to enroll.106  The high 
costs to the state arise from the high level of DirigoChoice subsidies.  As of February 
2010, 83% of those enrolled in DirigoChoice were eligible for state subsidies, and 
50% of enrollees fell below 150% of the FPL, thereby receiving state subsidies of 
80% of their monthly premiums.107  A robust small employer-based health coverage 
system has yet to materialize in Maine, and the state has been forced to bear the bulk 
                                                          
 99 ME. REV. STAT. ANN, tit. 24-A, § 6981.    
 100 Kucskar, supra note 87, at 401 (describing negative side effects of Maine’s state health 
care reform). 
 101 ME. REV. STAT. ANN, tit. 24-A, § 2742-B(2).    
 102 States Moving Toward Comprehensive Health Care Reform, KAISER COMM’N ON 
MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED (2008), http://www.kff.org/uninsured/statehealthreform/ 
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 103 Dirigo Health Monthly Numbers February 2010, DIRIGO HEALTH AGENCY, 1 (March 4, 
2010), http://www.dirigohealth.maine.gov/Documents/Numbers_February10.pdf. 
 104 Annual Report State Fiscal Year 2008, DIRIGO HEALTH AGENCY, supra note 86, at 32. 
 105 Annual Report State Fiscal Year 2008, DIRIGO HEALTH AGENCY, supra note 86,  at 2, 4. 
 106 Annual Report State Fiscal Year 2008, DIRIGO HEALTH AGENCY, supra note 86,  at 2. 
 107 Dirigo Health Monthly Numbers February 2010, DIRIGO HEALTH AGENCY, supra note 
103. 
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of the funding burden of health care reform through individual subsidies, which it 
simply cannot afford.   
In terms of overall coverage statistics, in 2002, the last pre-DirigoChoice year, 
Maine’s uninsured rate was 11.3%,108 whereas in 2008 the uninsured rate had 
dropped to only 10.4%.109  In six years, Maine had increased the total number of 
covered residents by a mere 57,000 people, not even halfway towards its goal of 
universal coverage.110  Nonetheless, in 2008, Maine’s uninsured rate was 
impressively the 11th lowest in the country.111 
While Maine may be performing above average in terms of overall coverage 
rates, its employment-based coverage statistics are more troubling.  In 2008, 71.2% 
of those who were uninsured were employed, which is the 11th worst rate in the 
nation.112  In other words, almost three-quarters of Maine’s uninsured population are 
employed.  Given that the DirigoChoice program focuses on small employers 
providing coverage, the percentage of full-time working uninsured residents is not 
what would be expected if the program were a great success.  
In light of the percentage of working uninsured Maine residents, it is no surprise 
that within the DirigoChoice program, as of February 2010, only 29% of the 
members purchasing DirigoChoice were small group employers, with 44% being 
individuals and 27% being sole proprietors.113  Only 46% of those DirigoChoice 
employer purchasers had previously offered no insurance to their employees.114  In 
other words, more than half of the employers purchasing DirigoChoice have been 
merely switching from another insurance provider to DirigoChoice.    
Outside of DirigoChoice, small employer purchasers the story is similar.  In 
2009, only 41.8% of Maine employers with fewer than 50 employees provided 
insurance coverage to their employees.115  Moreover, among private sector 
employers of all sizes, from 2008 through 2009, the percentage of Vermont 
                                                          
 108 Health Insurance Coverage Status by State for All People: 2002, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 
(2003), http://pubdb3.census.gov/macro/032003/health/h06_000.htm. 
 109 Health Insurance Coverage by Status by State for All People: 2008, U.S. CENSUS 
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nonelderly adult residents receiving employment-based coverage actually decreased 
by 2.8%.116     
Corresponding to Maine’s relatively unimpressive employment-based coverage 
rates is Maine’s ranking as the state with the 3rd highest rate of Medicaid enrollment, 
with 27% of Maine residents receiving Medicaid in 2007.117  Although this 
percentage merely verifies that Maine intentionally expanded its Medicaid program 
through the Dirigo Act to expand coverage to the poor, it also demonstrates that 
almost 1/5 of Maine’s population has an income below 200% of the FPL, and that 
employers are not stepping up to the plate to provide insurance for those Medicaid 
residents who are employed.   
C.  The Impact of the National Health Reform Law on Maine 
The DPC’s report on the benefits of the Reform Law for Maine predicts that the 
new law will provide new coverage options for 135,000 presently uninsured 
Mainers.118  On the financial side of health care coverage, 99,100 Mainers will 
receive tax credits for health insurance premiums and average family health 
insurance premiums will be reduced by $1,730 to $2,470 a year.119  These coverage 
and financial predictions for Maine are somewhat similar to the predictions for 
Hawaii under the Reform Law, which is expected, given that Maine and Hawaii have 
very similar population sizes, with Maine being slightly larger in population.120  Still, 
Maine’s coverage scenario is likely to improve more than Hawaii’s under the new 
federal law and Mainers’ health care costs are predicted to decrease substantially 
more than Hawaiians’ health care costs under the Reform Law.  The greater 
improvement in coverage for Maine may be because Hawaii’s existing uninsured 
rate is already fairly impressive compared to Maine’s rate, so there is less room for 
improvement in Hawaii.  Similarly, in terms of costs, Hawaii has already reaped 
whatever cost savings result from having an employer mandate, whereas the Reform 
Law’s “pay or play” employer mandate is new to Maine.  Moreover, some of 
Maine’s predicted greater costs savings may be due to the fact that Hawaiians 
already enjoy substantial cost savings through HMSA’s monopsony powers, whereas 
Maine does not have a similar monopsony situation.     
                                                          
 116 Kaiser Family Foundation, Percentage Point Change Amount Nonelderly Adults 19-64 
by Coverage Type, 2008-2009, http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparetable.jsp?ind=172& 
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Turning to Maine’s poor population, the DPC anticipates that the Reform Law 
will expand Medicaid to cover an additional 54,707 residents.121  This is less than 
half of the predicted new Medicaid eligible Hawaiians under the Reform Law.  Most 
likely, this difference is due to the Dirigo Act’s existing Medicaid reforms being 
more generous and expanding Medicaid coverage more than Hawaii’s QUEST 
program, particularly given that Hawaii has closed off Medicaid enrollment to 
certain groups.  Accordingly, Hawaii would be expected to experience greater 
Medicaid coverage expansion under the Reform Law. 
Since DirigoChoice focuses on small business-based insurance coverage, it is 
important to look at the DPC’s predictions regarding changes for Maine employer-
based coverage under the Reform Law.  Presently, only 45.6% of Maine small 
businesses are able to offer health insurance coverage to their employees, a statistic 
which does not shine favorably on the success of DirigoChoice in encouraging small 
businesses to provide coverage.122  Under the Reform Law, the DPC predicts that 
25,804 Maine small businesses employing 92,600 Mainers will be eligible for tax 
credits to assist in paying for the employer’s share of employee health insurance.123  
These new federal tax credits may improve the incentives for Maine small 
businesses to provide coverage to their employees.   
Beyond the DPC’s general predictions and honing in on the interplay between 
the provisions of the Reform Law and those of the Dirigo Act, one of the most 
striking differences between the two is the contrast between the Reform Law’s 
health insurance exchange concept and the DirigoChoice single-payer government 
run insurer concept.  The Reform Law does not provide for a public option plan, but 
instead primarily relies upon state-based insurance exchanges to offer coverage to 
individuals and small businesses.124  The closest the Reform Law comes to a public 
option is the state-based Basic Health Plan option for low income individuals, 
discussed supra, and the requirement that the Office of Personnel Management 
contract with insurers to offer at least two multi-state plans in each exchange, one of 
which must be offered by a non-profit entity.125  In other words, DirigoChoice and 
the Reform Law’s respective approaches to providing coverage to individuals and 
small businesses are fundamentally different.  Accordingly, Maine probably has two 
choices for DirigoChoice under the Reform Law:  1) alter DirigoChoice to fit the 
requirements of the Reform Law state-based Basic Health Plan option, or 2) alter 
DirigoChoice to fit within one or both of the state exchanges. 
If DirigoChoice becomes Maine’s Basic Health Plan, then it would receive an 
influx of federal funding under that option, but would also have to meet the essential 
benefit and the maximum cost requirements for insureds under the Reform Law’s 
Basic Health Plan option, and would no longer provide coverage to those with 
incomes between 201% and 300% of the FPL.  Under this scenario, DirigoChoice’s 
financial situation should improve, but the scope of coverage would be restricted to 
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 122 See supra note 117, at 2. 
 123 See supra note 117, at 2. 
 124 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act §§ 1304, 1311. 
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those earning less than 200% of the FPL, whereas DirigoChoice presently applies to 
those earning up to 300% of the FPL.     
Alternatively, if DirigoChoice chooses to join the Maine exchanges, then it may 
be forced to make some modifications to meet the Reform Law exchange 
requirements.  Most significantly, DirigoChoice would have to sell coverage to small 
businesses with up to 100 employees, whereas DirigoChoice presently only offers 
coverage to small businesses with between 2 and 50 employees.126  Of course, this 
alteration expands the scope of coverage, but because of that expansion, it also 
increases the costs of DirigoChoice to the state.  
Separate and apart from changes brought on by the Reform Law’s insurance 
exchange concept, concerns arise regarding application of the Reform Law’s “pay or 
play” employer mandate to Maine’s voluntary DirigoChoice program.  The Reform 
Law’s employer mandate fails to remedy the problems posed by the interconnected 
issues of DirigoChoice’s voluntariness and the perceived high buyer-side costs of 
DirigoChoice.  Under Maine’s current system, “small businesses and individuals 
have complained that the [DirigoChoice buyer-side] costs remain too high.”127  Many 
business owners claim that the cost to purchase DirigoChoice for employees is more 
expensive than purchasing private health insurance for their employees.128  
Moreover, the buyer-side costs continue to increase, as in January 2010, the small 
employer monthly premium rates were expected to increase by 8.4% from the 
previous year and the individual monthly premium rates were expected to increase 
by 8.1% from the previous year.129   
These high buyer-side costs combine with the voluntariness of DirigoChoice to 
create a problem of low enrollment and high dropout.130  Dirigo Health projected, 
based on anticipated premium rate increases, that a number of DirigoChoice 
members will terminate their coverage in 2010.131  As recently as 2008, 15% of 
members were dropping coverage at the end of the year instead of renewing 
coverage.132  The high buyer-side costs have consistently proven to be a problem for 
Maine in voluntarily recruiting small businesses to participate in DirigoChoice.133 
Even though the Reform Law imposes a “pay or play” employer mandate with a 
tax penalty opt out, it exempts employers with 50 or fewer employees, the precise 
small employer target for DirigoChoice.134  Accordingly, the Reform Law’s “pay or 
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play” employer mandate does not solve the DirigoChoice voluntariness problems 
with regard to improving small business enrollment.   
Unlike the Reform Law’s employer mandate, its “pay or play” individual 
mandate should remedy enrollment problems with regard to DirigoChoice individual 
purchasers.  The Reform Law’s individual mandate requires all United States 
citizens to either obtain coverage, or pay a tax penalty of the greater of $695 per year 
up to a maximum of three times that amount per family or 2.5% of the individual’s 
household income.135  Some individuals are exempt from the mandate; most notably 
those with financial hardships, those for whom the lowest cost plan option exceeds 
8% of an individual’s income and those with incomes below the tax filing 
threshold.136  However, these exemptions are limited to a small population and most 
Maine individual purchasers without employer-based, Medicaid or Medicare 
insurance will have to choose between paying a penalty and receiving no health 
insurance, or obtaining health insurance.  Under the Reform Law, no longer will 
most Maine individual purchasers be able to avoid purchasing coverage because 
costs are too high or because they would “rather risk it.”  Therefore, the Reform 
Law’s individual mandate will most definitely increase enrollment in a program like 
DirigoChoice. 
Having demonstrated that the Reform Law yields mixed results on the 
voluntariness problems of DirigoChoice, the next issue is how the Reform Law deals 
with the high buyer-side costs for individuals and small businesses under 
DirigoChoice.  The DirigoChoice buyer-side costs or premiums are high for small 
businesses because of the “high rate of [state] subsidies for low-income 
individuals.”137  As a result of the subsidy costs to the state, DirigoChoice has been 
unable to offer lower premium rates to small businesses.138  Ironically, if more small 
businesses enrolled in DirigoChoice, then the premiums would actually decrease.139   
The Reform Law assists small employers with high buyer-side costs by providing 
a tax credit to the employer tied to the employer’s contribution toward employees’ 
premiums.140  Subject to the caveats discussed supra under the Hawaii experience, 
the structure of the tax credit varies over time, is temporary and phases out as firm 
size and average annual wages for the firm increase.141  However, until the 
temporary tax credit period ends, the tax credit increases over time, starting at 35% 
of the employer’s contribution toward the premium and maxing out at 50% of the 
employer’s contribution.142   
In the short term, for small employers with 25 employees or less, the Reform 
Law is a boon.  Under DirigoChoice, Maine does not provide these employers with 
any sort of benefit or assistance to provide coverage.  The Reform Law, at least 
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temporarily, provides these employers with a substantial tax credit, creating a greater 
incentive for them to purchase coverage for their employees.  However, these small 
employers may not choose to remain in the market after the tax credit disappears.  
Still, as discussed supra, once more employers enter into the insurance market, the 
costs of purchasing go down, as a result of risk spreading.  Accordingly, even after 
the tax credits expire, small business may find it financially acceptable to remain in a 
market with such decreased costs. 
Moving from the employer purchasers to individual purchasers, a major buyer-
side cost saving provision is that the Reform Law requires that out of pocket limits 
be no higher than the federal limits on Health Savings Accounts, 143 which are 
currently $5,950 for individuals and $11,900 for families.144  Moreover, under the 
Reform Law low income individuals with incomes between 100% and 400% of the 
FPL will have annual out of pocket limits between $1,983 and $3,987 depending on 
where they stand in relation to the FPL.145  They will also receive sliding scale cost-
sharing subsidies, such that those with incomes of 100% to 150% of the FPL will 
pay no more than 6% of their health care costs and those with incomes of 250% to 
400% of the FPL will pay no more than 30% of their health care costs.146  
Individuals and families with incomes between 100% and 400% of the FPL will also 
receive premium credits to purchase insurance through the exchanges.147  The 
premium tax credits will be tied to the second cheapest plan in the exchange, the 
Silver plan, and will be set on a sliding scale such that those with incomes from 
100% to 150% of the FPL will pay no more than 2% to 4% of their income toward 
premiums and individuals with incomes from 300% to 400% of the FPL will pay no 
more than 9.5% of their income toward premiums.148     
Looking at individual purchasers regardless of income, the Reform Law 
maximum individual deductible is slightly smaller than that of DirigoChoice, while 
the Reform Law individual out of pocket limits are slightly larger than those of 
DirigoChoice; the two cancel each other out.  At this stage it is unknown what the 
premiums will be like under the Reform Law in Maine versus what they are now 
under DirigoChoice, so it is impossible to compare the two in terms of cost savings.  
Therefore, taking into account only the known cost savings, the Reform Law does 
not bring about significant health care cost reductions for Maine individual 
purchasers.  Nonetheless, as a result of the improved risk spreading under the federal 
individual mandate, individual insurance costs should become more attractive to 
purchasers anyway. 
Compared with individual purchasers in general, lower income Maine individual 
purchasers benefit more from the Reform Law.  First, the various Reform Law 
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buyer-side subsidies extend to those making up to 400% of the FPL, whereas the 
DirigoChoice subsidies only extend to those making up to 300% of the FPL.  
Second, the cost sharing subsidy under the federal law is drastically more generous 
than the one under DirigoChoice.  On the downside, the Reform Law does not treat 
maximum deductibles for low income individual purchasers any different than 
deductibles for higher income individual purchasers.  In fact, compared to 
DirigoChoice maximum deductibles for the wealthiest of low income individual 
purchasers, the Reform Law allows maximum deductibles $1,000 higher.  Moreover, 
there is little difference between the out of pocket limits for lower income individual 
purchasers under DirigoChoice and lower income individual purchasers under the 
Reform Law.  Still, the fact that more low income Mainers receive various subsidies 
under the Reform Law and receive better cost sharing subsidies makes the Reform 
Law an overall improvement for lower income Maine individual purchasers.                
IV.  VERMONT 
A.  The Health Care Affordability Act 
In May 2006, Vermont enacted the Health Care Affordability Act (“HCAA”) and 
began its journey toward universal coverage.149  Following Maine and joining 
Massachusetts, Vermont’s HCAA is one of only three existing state statutes, which 
fully commits the state to universal health care access.  The HCAA expressly 
provides that “[i]t is the policy of the state of Vermont to ensure universal access to 
and coverage for essential health care services for all Vermonters.”150  More 
specifically, the HCAA aims to achieve universal coverage by guaranteeing a 
minimum level of preventive service to Vermont residents and by reducing chronic 
care costs and applying those savings towards covering the state’s uninsured 
residents.151  
There are three major provisions of the HCAA that promote the goal of universal 
coverage:  1) A standard health care plan available to all uninsured residents; 
2) Premium assistance to poor employed residents to purchase employer-sponsored 
health insurance; and 3) A “pay or play” provision requiring employers to provide 
health insurance coverage to employees or pay a state assessment.152  Of the 
provisions, the primary vehicle for HCAA’s universal coverage goal is Catamount 
Health (“Catamount”), “a voluntary universal plan to control rising costs and help 
cover 69,000 uninsured citizens.”153  Although participation in Catamount is 
presently voluntary, if more than 4% of Vermont residents remain uninsured by the 
end of 2010, Vermont will consider mandating enrollment in Catamount.154    
                                                          
 149 Vermont Heath Care Affordability Act, No. 191 (2006). 
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 151 Kucskar, supra note 87, at 392 (describing the legislative objectives of the HCAA). 
 152 Kaiser Family Foundation, Vermont Health Care Reform Plan, 1 (Dec. 2007) 
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Catamount is administered by three private insurers and available to any 
uninsured state resident.155  For those Vermont residents with incomes at or below 
300% of the FPL, Catamount provides sliding-scale insurance subsidies based on 
income level.156  For example, in the year 2008, the individual contribution for the 
lowest cost Catamount plan was capped at $60 per month for those at 200% of the 
FPL or less and $135 per month for those at 300% of the FPL or less.157  The 
individual contribution changes from year to year based on the growth in overall 
spending per Catamount enrollee.158  Even uninsured residents whose income is 
above 300% FPL can participate in Catamount by paying the actual cost of the plan, 
which is a monthly premium of $393 per individual or $1,100 per family.159  
Along with premium costs, other costs to Catamount enrollees include:  1) A 
$250.00 in-network individual deductible, a $500.00 in-network family deductible, a 
$500.00 out-of-network individual deductible and a $1,000.00 out-of-network family 
deductible; 2) 20% co-insurance payments; 3) $10 office co-payments; 
4) Prescription drug coverage without a deductible, $10 co-payments for generic 
drugs, $30 co-payments for preferred drugs and $50 co-payments for nonpreferred 
drugs; and 5) $800 individual in-network out-of-pocket maximums, $1,600 family 
in-network out-of-pocket maximums, $1,500 individual out-of-network out-of-
pocket maximums and $3,000 family out-of-network out-of-pocket maximums.160  
Notably, Catamount enrollees do not pay any deductible for chronic care or 
preventive care.161 
Unlike commercial insurers, Catamount insurers are prohibited from limiting or 
altering coverage on the basis of a number of risk factors, including age, gender, 
geographic area, and experience rating.162  Moreover, Catamount insurers must use a 
community rating method to determine premiums.163  However, the HCAA imposes 
other limits on coverage.  First, the definition of “uninsured” under the HCAA does 
not include those who are eligible for Medicare, Medicaid, or two other state medical 
insurance programs.164  Second, the term “uninsured” also excludes those who have 
had private or employer-sponsored insurance within the 12 month period before the 
date of application for Catamount.165  Third, the HCAA also contains a specific 
eligibility exclusion for applicants who are eligible for employer-sponsored 
                                                          
 155 Id. at tit. 8, § 4080f (b), (d)(1).  See also Brent R. Trame, Going Dutch:  Can Holland 
Solve the U.S. Insurance Problem?, 16 Elder L.J. 445, 469 (2009) (discussing how Catamount 
assists the elderly). 
 156 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 1984 (2006). 
 157 Id. § 1984(c). 
 158 Id. § 1984(b). 
 159 Id. § 1984(c)(1)(G); Kaiser Family Foundation, supra note 152, at 1. 
 160 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4080f (c)(1) (2006). 
 161 Id. § 4080f (c)(1)(F). 
 162 Id. § 4080f (j). 
 163 Id. 
 164 Id. § 4080f (a)(9). 
 165 Id. 
102 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 24:79 
 
insurance, except for certain circumstances involving individuals who are eligible for 
employer-sponsored insurance and have an income of 300% of the FPL or less.166  
Beyond the statutory Catamount coverage limitations, Catamount insurers may 
also apply preexisting condition limitations on coverage.167  For those without proof 
of creditable coverage, insurers may limit coverage of preexisting conditions, which 
existed during the 12-month period prior to the application date, with the exception 
of enrollees in a chronic care management program and pregnant women (“12-month 
exclusion”).168  Additional exceptions to preexisting condition exclusions include 
subscribers who applied to Catamount before November 1, 2008, and applicants who 
were previously “insured in the nongroup market, lost his or her employment, 
terminated insurance coverage, and had no other private insurance or employer-
sponsored coverage . . . for the 12 months preceding his or her application.”169        
Despite the option for Catamount insurers to impose certain coverage limitations, 
Catamount insurers are required to cover a broad array of health care services.  The 
HCAA expressly provides that “Catamount Health shall provide coverage for 
primary care, preventive care, chronic care, acute episodic care, and hospital 
services.”170  Focusing specifically on chronic care, the HCAA requires Catamount 
insurers to provide a chronic care management program that focuses on coordinating 
care for patients with chronic conditions, increasing communications between health 
care providers and patients, and patient self-management, education, wellness, and 
follow-up.171    
Along with Catamount, there are two other HCAA provisions directed toward 
universal coverage.  First, the HCAA provides premium subsidies to employed 
individuals with incomes less than 300% of the poverty level to purchase employer-
sponsored insurance, if it is more cost-effective than having those individuals enroll 
in Catamount or Vermont’s Medicaid program.172  Under this provision, if the 
employee is eligible for the Vermont Health Access Plan, then his or her maximum 
premium is limited to no more than $49 per month, depending on the person’s 
income.173  Otherwise, the premium level ranges from $60 per month to $185 per 
month, depending on the person’s income.174  Second, the HCAA contains a “pay or 
play” provision, which requires employers with five or more employees to either 
provide coverage to their full-time employees or pay a contribution per year per 
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uncovered employee to the state.175  The state assessment increases annually at a rate 
corresponding to Catamount’s premium growth.176 
B.  Vermont’s Coverage Outcomes   
Catamount went into effect on October 1, 2007.177  Following implementation of 
Catamount, Vermont’s coverage results are mixed.  However, Catamount has only 
had a little over two years to produce increased health care coverage results, and is 
therefore, still in its infancy.  Moreover, big changes may not be expected, as at the 
time of Catamount’s implementation, Vermont already had a low rate of uninsured 
residents, low rate of uninsured children, and one of the lowest poverty rates in the 
nation.178   
Catamount’s enrollment numbers started out slow, as approximately only 700 
individuals enrolled during the first year.179  However, by July 2009, around 9,500 
had enrolled in Catamount, and enrollment in all of Vermont’s various state 
sponsored health care coverage programs had increased by over 23,000.180  Though a 
23,000 increase is promising, there must also be a significant increase in 
employment-based coverage for Vermont to meet its future goal of a 96% coverage 
rate and coverage for an additional 69,000 residents by the end of 2010.  This may in 
fact be what is happening.  In 2007, which was mostly a pre-Catamount year, 88.8% 
of Vermont residents had some sort of health insurance coverage, whereas in 2008, 
that percentage had increased to 90.8%.181  Assuming this rate of increase rises in 
2009 and 2010, Vermont is on target to achieve its goal of 96% coverage by the end 
of 2010.  This is hardly an impossible goal, as in 2008, Vermont already had the 
fourth highest percentage of residents with health insurance coverage in the 
country.182   
Turning to coverage statistics for employment-based coverage, Vermont, through 
its “pay or play” provision, encourages employers to share the burden of providing 
coverage to Vermonters, most likely with the hope that the state budget does not bear 
the full brunt of coverage costs.  Unfortunately, the statistics on employer-based 
coverage do not reflect such success.  In 2007 and 2008, 74.3% of uninsured 
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Vermont residents were employed full-time, which is the fifth worst rate in the 
country.183   
The private sector in Vermont is clearly not taking an active role in providing 
health care coverage.  In 2009, only 56.4% of firms in Vermont offered health 
insurance to their employees, the 16th highest rate of employment-based coverage in 
the United States.184  Moreover, employment-based coverage for Vermont 
nonelderly adult residents increased by only 1.1% from 2007 to 2008.185  Looking at 
the issue from a different angle, in the first year of the “pay or play” program, 1,000 
employers chose to pay the assessment fee instead of providing coverage.186  On the 
public sector side of the scale, from 2007 to 2008, 19.2% of Vermont’s population 
was enrolled in Medicaid, the fifth highest in the country.187  Given these statistics, 
the HCAA has yet to demonstrate much success in encouraging employers to 
provide more coverage to employees.        
C.  The Impact of the National Health Reform Law on Vermont 
The DPC’s report on the benefits of the Reform Law for Vermont predicts that 
the Reform Law will provide new coverage options for 74,000 presently uninsured 
Vermont residents.188  This number is a little more than half of the number for Maine 
and Hawaii’s similar statistical category, which makes sense given that Vermont is 
about half of the population size of Maine and Hawaii.189  In terms of health care 
financial assistance, the Reform Law will provide 52,800 Vermonters with tax 
credits for health insurance premiums and will reduce the average Vermont family 
health insurance premiums by $1,690 to $2,410 a year.190  Given their respective 
population sizes, the former statistic is proportionally in line with Maine’s numbers 
and the latter statistic represents similar savings for the two states.   
Focusing on Vermont’s poor, the DPC does not provide statistics for the 
anticipated number of new Vermont Medicaid enrollees under the Reform Law, but 
the report states that Vermont’s Medicaid program will receive $420 million in new 
federal funding.191  Given that Vermont has the fifth highest percentage population 
                                                          
 183 URBAN INST. AND KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, supra note 38. 
 184 AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND QUALITY, supra note 41. 
 185 URBAN INST. AND KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, supra note 116. 
 186 Patricia A. Butler, Including Employer Financing in State Health Reform Initiatives: 
Implications of Recent Court Decisions, NAT’L ACAD. FOR STATE HEALTH POLICY, 3 
(Jan. 2009), 
http://www.nashp.org/sites/default/files/Jan%202009%20ERISA%20Update%20FINAL.pdf.  
 187 URBAN INST. AND KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, supra note 45. 
 188 DEMOCRATIC POLICY COMM., The Benefits of Health Reform in Vermont, 1 (June 22, 
2010), http://dpc.senate.gov/docs/sr-111-2-41_states/vt.pdf. Most likely, the difference 
between the number of uninsured Vermonters identified by the DPC and the number of 
uninsured Vermonters identified infra is the result of different dates or methods of measuring 
the number of uninsured Vermonters. 
 189 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 120. 
 190 DEMOCRATIC POLICY COMM., supra note 188, at 2.  
 191 DEMOCRATIC POLICY COMM., supra note 188, at 2.   
2010] THE SKELETON KEY 105 
 
of Medicaid enrollees in the country, this influx of new funding will help Vermont to 
sustain the program and decrease the state’s Medicaid financial burden.   
Transitioning to Reform Law’s benefits to Vermont small businesses, the DPC 
report notes that presently, only 45.8% of Vermont small businesses can offer health 
insurance coverage to their employees, and 81% of Vermont businesses are small 
businesses.192  Astonishingly, together these statistics mean that almost one half of 
all employers in Vermont do not offer health insurance to their employees.  
However, under the Reform Law, the DPC predicts that 14,441 Vermont small 
businesses will be eligible for tax credits to assist in paying for the employer’s share 
of employee health insurance.193  Moreover, these small businesses employ 52,324 
Vermonters.194  These tax credits, if substantial enough, may provide a much needed 
incentive for Vermont small businesses to provide coverage.   
Juxtaposing Catamount onto the Reform Law, in some ways Catamount 
represents a mini-version of the reforms contemplated by the Reform Law.  Despite 
these similarities, Vermont will have to substantially expand parts of the Catamount 
program and modify or eliminate other requirements and restrictions in order to 
transition smoothly into the system contemplated under the Reform Law.  For 
example, one of the similarities between Catamount and the Reform Law is 
Catamount’s administration by three different competing private insurers and the 
Reform Law’s insurance exchange idea with multiple insurers competing to sell 
coverage.  Although the multi-seller idea is common to both, for Catamount to join 
Vermont’s insurance exchanges under the Reform Law, Catamount must expand its 
scope of coverage beyond a program to sell coverage to individuals, and must also 
sell coverage to small businesses with up to 100 employees.195  This would be quite a 
sizeable expansion and cost increase to Catamount. 
Another similarity between the two programs is Catamount’s embodiment of the 
Reform Law’s two general concepts of a standard health care plan with a minimum 
level of mandated benefits along with specific market restrictions and regulations.  In 
terms of benefit levels, the Reform Law mandates minimum standard benefits in two 
ways:  1) Requiring the state-based Basic Health Plan option for uninsured 
individuals between 133% and 200% of the FPL to provide defined essential health 
benefits; and 2) Requiring all insurers within the individual and small group markets 
to provide comprehensive coverage or essential health benefits in one of four benefit 
categories, as defined by the Secretary of Health and Human Services 
(“Secretary”).196  As to the former, although Catamount already resembles the Basic 
Health Plan option and although Vermont could transform Catamount into its Basic 
Health Plan option, Vermont would also have to meet the requirements of the Basic 
Health Plan option, including, most notably, restricting the scope of Catamount to 
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individuals between 133% and 200% of the FPL, whereas Catamount currently 
serves almost all Vermonters.197   
As to the Reform Law’s minimum mandated benefits for the individual and small 
group markets, the statute expressly requires coverage for general categories of 
benefits, including hospitalization, maternity and newborn care, as well as 
prescription drugs, and ambulatory, emergency, mental health, rehabilitative, 
laboratory, preventive, chronic care management and pediatric services.198  
Comparatively, Catamount mandates minimum benefits of coverage for primary, 
preventive, acute episodic and chronic care, as well as a chronic care management 
program and hospital services.199  There are obvious similarities between the two 
programs, but the specific federal minimum benefits have yet to be announced by the 
Secretary.  Nonetheless, looking at the language of the federal statute, the federal 
benefit mandates are likely to be at least, if not more, comprehensive than those of 
Catamount, and it is likely Vermont will have to adjust its mandated benefit 
requirements accordingly.       
Moving from mandated benefit levels to market restrictions and eligibility 
restrictions, Vermont will have to make substantial changes to Catamount to meet 
the Reform Law requirements.  For premium determination within the individual, 
small group market and exchanges, the Reform Law allows rating variation based 
only on age, geographic area, actuarial value, family composition and tobacco use, 
and limits the rating variation to a three to one ratio.200  By prohibiting all ratings 
except for community rating, Catamount takes the exact opposite approach as the 
Reform Law.201  Arguably, Vermont’s community rating system is a better system 
because it avoids wide premium cost disparity between younger and older people 
and consequently heavier financial burdens on older people, as will likely occur 
under the age rating system authorized under the Reform Law.  However, Vermont 
will have to change its rating requirements to fit the Reform Law because the 
Reform Law’s state innovation waiver provision does not apply with regard to 
insurance premium ratings.202  
In terms of eligibility provisions, the Reform Law includes guaranteed 
availability of coverage, guaranteed renewability of coverage, elimination of 
preexisting condition exclusions, and prohibition of group coverage waiting periods 
beyond 90 days.203  Catamount does not include any of these provisions, and even 
allows for limited preexisting condition exclusions and exclusions for those who 
were insured within the 12 month period before they applied for Catamount.204  
Critics have argued that these eligibility limiting provisions adversely impact 
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middle-aged or older residents, who would otherwise benefit extensively from 
Catamount, given Catamount’s mandatory price caps on high health care costs, 
mandatory chronic care programs, and premiums based on community ratings. 205  
Fortunately, for these individuals, the Reform Law’s state innovation wavier does 
not apply to the eligibility provisions of the Reform Law and  Vermont will have to 
modify Catamount’s eligibility requirements to expand coverage and eliminate the 
preexisting condition exclusion and 12-month exclusion.206 
Refocusing on the interplay between cost and coverage in health care reform, a 
major concern of the Catamount program has been whether its costs will prove 
unaffordable for low and moderate income individuals and families, and whether 
those costs will negatively impact enrollment under Vermont’s current voluntary 
individual market.207  For example, using the costs discussed supra, a currently 
uninsured Catamount individual purchaser with an income just above 300% of the 
FPL will pay almost $5,000 per year in health insurance premiums, as well as the 
cost of other health care expenditures.  The Reform Law’s cost limitations on 
deductibles and out of pocket limits do not resolve the affordability problem under 
Catamount, and may in fact exacerbate the problem.  The Reform Law’s maximum 
individual deductible can be as high as $2,000, and the out of pocket individual 
limits can be as high as $6,000, numbers that are grossly higher than even the out of 
network individual deductibles and the out of network, out of pocket individual 
maximums under Catamount, both of which are under $2,000.208  Fortunately, 
Vermont can apply for a state innovation waiver with regard to these federally 
imposed higher limits, and if approved, keep its more affordable deductible and out 
of pocket maximums, provided that it meets the other waiver requirements describe 
supra.209 
In contrast to the impact of the Reform Law on Catamount affordability for all 
Vermonters, regardless of income, the Reform Law may improve affordability for 
Vermonters entitled to subsidies compared to the existing situation under 
Catamount.  First, the Reform Law expands cost sharing subsidies to 400% of the 
FPL, whereas Catamount only provides subsidies to those who earn 300% of the 
FPL or less.210  Second, the Reform Law provides premium tax credits, whereas 
Catamount does not.211      
Despite these Reform Law affordability improvements for low income 
Vermonters, the subsidy levels for low income individuals under either Catamount 
or the Reform Law differ only slightly.  For example, under the Reform Law, those 
between 250% and 400% of the FPL receive 70% of cost sharing subsidies, and 
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under Catamount, those at 300% of the FPL pay a little more than one third of the 
premium cost that an individual earning above 300% of the FPL pays.212  
Accordingly, for low income Vermonters, more people will get assistance and will 
get tax credits that they currently do not receive, but the level of cost-sharing 
subsidies will increase only slightly for low income individuals under the Reform 
Law.          
From the state’s perspective, the increase in federal funding through subsidies 
will be a big benefit to Vermont’s coffers.  Analysts have speculated that Vermont 
may not have the necessary long term state funding to support its current health care 
reform program.213  Vermont already had to commit more funding to the program 
than initially planned because CMS denied Vermont’s Medicaid waiver for federal 
funds “to finance Catamount Health Plan premium subsidies for individuals with 
incomes between 200-300 percent FPL.”214  The new federal funding subsidies alter 
the status quo and decrease the financial burden on Vermont. 
Concluding with the federal individual and employer mandates, both provisions 
represent major changes to Catamount.  For individuals, Vermont’s HCAA law 
presently provides for individual voluntary compliance with the option for the 
Vermont legislature to consider mandating individual enrollment at the end of this 
year.215  Conversely, the Reform Law affirmatively creates a “pay or play” individual 
mandate.216  This federal individual mandate should increase coverage rates over 
Vermont’s current voluntary system, for obvious reasons.  Moreover, as a result of 
improved risk spreading under the federal individual mandate, Vermont’s overall 
health insurance costs should decrease. 
Although the Reform Law’s creation of an individual “pay or play” mandate will 
improve overall coverage rates for Vermont, the Reform Law’s employer “pay or 
play” mandate is only likely to improve employer-based coverage rates for larger 
employers compared to HCAA’s employer “pay or play” mandate.  Under the 
Reform Law, small employers with 50 or fewer employees are exempt from the “pay 
or play” employer mandate, whereas the HCAA’s “pay or play” mandate applies to 
all employers, regardless of size.217  Due to the greater expansiveness of Vermont’s 
employer mandate, head-to-head with the Reform Law mandate, the Vermont 
employer mandate should result in a better rate of coverage.  Unfortunately, the 
federal employer “pay or play” mandate is not subject to the waiver for state 
innovation and Vermont will have to adjust its employer mandate to comply with the 
federal law.218   
For larger employers, the Reform Law’s “pay” provision of the employer “pay or 
play” mandate is much more substantial than Vermont’s state provision, requiring a 
payment of $3,000 or $2,000 per employee depending on whether or not the 
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employee is receiving a premium tax credit.219  In contrast, the HCAA’s “pay” 
provision requires a payment of only $91.25 per uncovered employee, as of 2008.220  
Accordingly, the federal provision provides a substantially stronger incentive than 
Vermont’s provision for larger employers to provide coverage to their employees, 
and therefore, should result in a higher employment-based insurance rate. 
V.  CONCLUSION       
The Reform Law is no skeleton key.  It does not unlock all of the solutions to all 
of the different problems posed by existing state health care systems and state 
reforms.  At times, it appears as if Congress attempted to preserve the good of state 
health care reform efforts, while eliminating the bad.  For example, Congress 
expressly preserved Hawaii’s stringent employer mandate, thereby promoting better 
coverage rates than would exist if Hawaii adopted the federal “pay or play” 
employer mandate.  On the flip side, Congress effectively eliminated Catamount’s 
12 month exclusion and authorization of preexisting condition exclusions, thereby 
extending coverage to more Vermonters than under the status quo.  
While some of Congress’ efforts appeared calculated to meet specific state 
concerns, other provisions of the Reform Law miss the mark and fail to remedy or 
make worse existing deficiencies in state systems.  For example, the Reform Law 
does nothing to improve enforcement of Hawaii’s employer mandate and does 
nothing to allow Hawaii to alter the PHCA to meet the new demands of a changing 
health care world.  Similarly, in Vermont, the Reform Law forces the state to get rid 
of its community rating method for establishing premiums in favor of a rating 
system based in part on age, that results in inequity and heavier premium costs borne 
by older people.  Moreover, the Reform Law allows for maximum deductibles and 
maximum out of pocket costs that are much higher and more unaffordable than the 
maximums allowed under Catamount. 
Because Congress was late in enacting comprehensive health care reform, it did 
not work with a blank slate when it came to the states.  Rather, Congress was faced 
with the impossible task of trying to design a federal system that addressed all of the 
health care idiosyncrasies of 50 states, including some with already significance 
health care reforms in place.  Given that comprehensive federal health care reform at 
times seemed like a Sisyphean challenge doomed to fail, overall it is impressive that 
Congress comprehensively tailor-made the Reform Law for the states.            
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